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ABSTRACT
Favourable sites for renewable generation are often remote
locations (such as islands) where installed capacity, e.g. from
wind turbines, exceeds local aggregate demand. We study
the effect that curtailment mechanisms - applied when there
is excess generation - have on the incentives to build addi-
tional capacity and the profitability of the generators. Next,
for a two-location setting, we study the combined effect that
curtailment schemes and line access rules have on the deci-
sion to invest in transmission expansion. In particular, for
“common access” rules, this leads to a Stackelberg game be-
tween transmission and local generation capacity investors,
and we characterise the equilibrium of this game. Finally,
we apply and exemplify our model to a concrete problem of
a grid reinforcement project, between Hunterston and the
Kintyre peninsula, in western Scotland, and we determine
a mechanism for setting transmission charges that assures
both the profitability of the line and local renewable in-
vestors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Integrating energy generated from renewable sources into
existing grids is one of the key challenges for ensuring a
sustainable, carbon-free energy future [1, 5]. A plethora
of incentives have led fast increases of installed renewable
generation capacity. However, a key problem is that lo-
cations which are best suited for installing new generation
capacity (due to favourable resources or social approval),
such as large wind turbines, are typically remote locations,
such as islands far from population/industry centres of high
electricity demand. At these areas, a substantial amount
of generated energy might be subject to curtailment, as it
cannot be absorbed by the grid, because of low local de-
mand or insufficient grid capacity to transport it elsewhere.
In practice, each location’s curtailment level and crucially
the curtailment policy applied are very significant factors
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affecting the decision of investors to build new generation
capacity [4]. Apart from technical, regulatory and legal im-
plications, covered by the power systems literature [3], the
curtailment schemes can play a crucial role in generation
and transmission expansion, the study of which is the prime
objective of our work.
Integration of renewable generation requires substantial
transmission investment, traditionally performed by distri-
bution network or transmission system operators (DNOs/
TSOs), often associated with prohibitive costs. For this rea-
son, incentivising privately built lines [2] would be highly
desirable from a public policy standpoint. New power lines
could be built under a “common access” principle, where
private line investors are required to allow access to third
parties, by setting a payment mechanism per unit of energy
transmitted, the level of which is subject to a cap set by the
regulator. In this work, we use game-theoretical models to
examine the interplay of curtailment mechanisms and line
access rules and we show this leads to a complex Stackel-
berg game, between the line investor and local generators,
and we determine the expected generation and profits at
equilibrium. Finally, we apply our theoretical results to a
real-life project.
2. CURTAILMENT STRATEGIES AND
GENERATION INCENTIVES
The most widely used curtailment schemes can be sum-
marised as last-in-first out (LIFO) and Pro Rata schemes.
In LIFO-based curtailment, generators are curtailed based
on the inverse order in which they were granted the right to
connect to the grid. By contrast, Pro Rata shares curtail-
ment equally among installed generators proportionally to
the rated capacity or actual power output, at the time of cur-
tailment. Our work shows that LIFO displays a clear market
advantage for early connections, leading to lower capacity
factors for “late” generators than Pro Rata, which is detri-
mental both for the viability of existing and future invest-
ment. Given an area where curtailment is imposed, we deter-
mine an upper level of tolerable curtailment, which enables
renewable capacity investment to be profitable, which de-
pends on the relation of the generation cost with the Feed in
Tariff (FiT) price. Moreover, since the curtailment scheme is
usually chosen by a regulatory authority or the local DNO,
we show that given a single location and a perfectly competi-
tive setting (Cournot analysis), the local generation capacity
is maximised under proportional curtailment schemes, which
share curtailment equally amongst generators.
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Figure 1: Transmission line connecting Scottish
mainland to the Kintyre peninsula
3. TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT
Next we consider two locations, where excess generation
and demand are not co-located: location A is a net con-
sumer (e.g. a mainland location with industry or significant
population density) and B is a net energy producer (e.g.
a remote region rich in wind resource). Moreover, we con-
sider two players: a line investor interested in building the
A − B transmission link and additional renewable genera-
tion capacity at B and a local player, who represents other
renewable generators or investors located at B.
Crucially, in this setting, the line investor has a “first
mover” advantage, as only he can build the grid infrastruc-
ture, which is expensive and technically challenging and only
a limited set of investors (such as DNO-approved or DNOs
themselves), have the technical expertise and regulatory ap-
proval to carry it out. The line investor (or leader) can
assess and evaluate the reaction of other investors to de-
termine his strategy, namely the capacity of the power line
and the level of renewable capacity to be installed, with ul-
timate goal to influence the equilibrium price and maximise
his profits. Local investors (or follower) can only act after
observing the leader’s strategy. This two-stage process is
analysed as a Stackelberg game and its equilibrium is found
through backward induction. We determine the expected
generation and profits for both players, for LIFO and Pro
Rata. Equilibrium results depend on the FiT price, trans-
mission fee, generation costs and the demand at A. We show
that under a LIFO scheme the line investor is protected from
any curtailment, hence he can build all generation capacity
to cover demand at A himself. On the other hand, a propor-
tional scheme leads to larger volumes of generation capacity
being built than actual demand, subject to an upper level
of curtailment.
4. NETWORK UPGRADE CASE-STUDY
Next, the theoretical model was applied to the concrete
case-study of the Kintyre-Hunterston transmission link, in
Western Scotland1 (see Fig. 1). The power grid in the Kin-
tyre peninsula, originally designed to serve a rural area,
proved insufficient to accommodate the large amounts of
wind generation built in the area. SSE (the local DNO) pro-
ceeded in a £230m network upgrade project, which includes
a sub-sea link, creating headroom for additional 150 MW of
renewable capacity. Based on the parameters of this project,
1https://www.ssepd.co.uk/KintyreHunterston/
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Figure 2: Effect of transmission fee on profits at
Stackelberg equilibrium
we determine the capacity built and the profits of the line
and local investors for a Stackelberg game.
In Fig. 2, we show the effect of the transmission fee pT
on the profits Π of the players. The transmission charges,
agreed by the line investor and the regulatory authority,
have to be set within a specific range. Low values of pT may
lead to the investment being aborted (i.e. when the leader’s
profits are above 0 – in our case, transmission charges need
to be at least £0.08/kWh) and high values might discour-
age additional investment from local community investors.
Regulatory authorities, who seek renewable facilitation can
promote grid infrastructure expansion, not only by provid-
ing subsidies or technical support, but by allowing “common
access” rules, as a tool to attract private investment and im-
prove the profitability of line investors. To our knowledge,
this is the first work examining the combined effects of cur-
tailment strategies and transmission access rules on genera-
tion capacity investment and foremost network expansion.
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